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CASE COMMENTS
and confusion in the minds of jurors. The possibility suggests itself
that these states, while limiting recovery to pecuniary losses, are,
practically speaking, putting in issue, by the admission of evidence
of character traits and habits, an element of damage they purport to
exclude-loss of companionship and solace.
The fact that the subject of the admissibility of character evidence
in a wrongful death action has rarely been the object of clear and
distinct scrutiny by the courts perhaps indicates that lawyers do not
often take advantage of the opportunity to go into the character
of the deceased-in such cases. The Basham case may serve to remind
counsel for plaintiffs and defendants alike that certainly under a
rule of damages for wrongful death in Virginia, and perhaps in all
jurisdictions, the ban on character evidence has been lifted.
GERALD ONEAL CLEMENS
SPOUSAL IMPUTATION OF NEGLIGENCE
IN JOINT ENTERPRISES
To impute the negligence of the driver of an automobile to a pas-
senger there must be a relationship between them sufficient to allow
a court to find some degree of fault, no matter how slight, on the pas-
senger's part. Joint enterprise, in modem tort law, is the magic doc-
trine that creates such a relationship. The doctrine operates irre-
spective of actual fault since it is based on right of control, an agency
concept often incorrectly applied to tort law in this field. Sherman v.
Korffl investigates this fault-imputing concept and correctly holds
that negligence should not be imputed unless the relationship between
the passenger and driver is such that a true agency relationship can be
shown to exist.
In Sherman v. Korf, a husband, his wife, and his mother went
on a weekend fishing trip. The husband and wife were co-owners of
the car; the wife was driving. The wife's negligence, concurring with
the negligence of the defendant, resulted in an accident in which the
husband-passenger was injured. The lower court imputed the wife's
contributory negligence to the husband, thereby preventing him from
recovering compensation for his injuries, even though in fact he was
not negligent. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the decision
of the trial court, Dethmers, C.J., dissenting.
291 N.V.2d 485 (Mich. 1958).
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The majority opinion in Sherman v. Korff deals with two dis-
tinct legal concepts used to impute the negligence of a driver to a
passenger: (i) agency through right of control; and (2) the tort doc-
trine of joint enterprise.
It is pure fiction, states the court, to impute the negligence of a
driver to a passenger on the ground that the passenger has a right of
control over the driver. Generally, "it is the duty of the passenger to
sit still and say nothing."2 For the passenger to attempt to exercise
control over. the driver is a course fraught with danger, and co-
ownership of the vehicle does not alter this situation. To say that a
mutual right of control in respect to ownership gives a mutual right
of control while traveling on a highway is to say that an agent for
one purpose is an agent for all purposes. Although there might be a
right of control in the sense of ownership, the court says in the prin-
cipal case that the husband had no right of control over any factor
causally connected with the accident. 3 Thus, as viewed by this court,
imputation of negligence on grounds of right of control is clearly erro-
neous. The court concludes its discussion of possible agency by deciding
that it is just as logical to find a bailee-bailor relationship as one of
agency. This appears to be valid reasoning, as right of control is a test
of agency, and where there is not enough right of control to create
agency, there is no reason for the court to find such a relationship.4
Thus the court refused to impute the negligence of the driver to a
passenger on the theory of agency because the requisite right of con-
trol was lacking.
The court holds that the application of the joint enterprise doc-
trine to the present fact situation would be equally untenable. Prosser
says that a joint enterprise exists when there is a common purpose
plus a mutual right of control, and considers this relationship as
",something like a partnership, for a more limited period of time and a
more limited purpose .... The law then considers that each is the
agent or servant of the others, and that the act of any one within the
scope of the enterprise is to be charged vicariously against the rest." 5
The court has already established that there was no right of control
sufficient to establish an agency relationship. It is further pointed
out that the marital relationship alone does not create a joint enter-
2id. at 487.
3Ibid.
'Restatement (Second), Agency § i (1958).
Prosser, Torts 365 (2d ed. x95). See 4 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence § 695 (2d
ed. i94).
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prise similar to that required by law for the imputation of negligence.6
A husband and wife on a weekend fishing trip are engaged in a family
recreational project which has no legal significance greater than that
created by the marital relationship itself.7
The majority in Sherman v. Korff has freed itself from the de-
cisions which impute negligence through joint enterprise by destroying
the one premise essential to its existence, i.e., right of control.8 The
decision, in effect, holds that co-ownership of an automobile does
not create a right of control which is strong enough to create either
an agency relationship or a joint enterprise, and thus co-ownership
will not serve to impute the negligence of a driver to a nonnegligent
passenger.
Chief Justice Dethmers' dissenting opinion treats the fact situation
in a more usual manner, concluding that the husband and wife were
engaged in a joint enterprise. The fishing trip raised a presumption
of joint enterprise, which was reinforced by co-ownership of the auto-
mobile, and its consequent right of control.
Historically, Thorogood v. Bryan,9 an 1849 English case, is the
basis for the theory of imputed negligence in the United States.' 0 In
Thorogood the negligence of the driver of an omnibus was imputed to
a passenger. The court "identified" the two as principal and agent by
saying that the passenger had a right of control over the driver."
691 N.W.2d at 488.
71d. at 488. See also Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 69o,
692 (1921).
Hower v. Roberts, 153 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1946); Roach v. Parker, 48 Del. 519,
107 A.2d 798, 8oo (Super. Ct. 1954); Snook v. Long, 241 Iowa 665, 42 N.W.2d
76 (195o); Silsby v. Hinchey, 107 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Mo. App. 1937); Prosser, Torts 363
(2d ed. 1955); Note, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 90, 92 (1953).
18 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849).
"°Sherman v. Korff, 91 N.W.2d 485 (Mich. 1958); Prosser, Torts 300 (2d ed.
1955); Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 Cornell L.Q.
320, 321 (1931).
"In Thorogood v. Bryan, and its companion case, Cattlin v. Hills, the idea
was advanced that a driver and a passenger in an omnibus (horse-drawn bus) might
be "identified" as master and servant, thus putting the passenger in the driver's
shoes so that he could not recover against a third party if his servant driver was
also negligent. In Thorogood, an omnibus negligently discharged a passenger, Mr.
Thorogood, in the middle of the street. The defendant's omnibus negligently
passed the one in which Thorogood had been riding, and in doing so, hit and killed
him. The court held that the driver who let Thorogood out in the middle of the street
was his agent, and thus Mrs. Thorogood was prevented from recovering from the
company operating the omnibus which struck and killed Thorogood. It was men-
tioned in this case that Mr. Thorogood was also negligent. In the Cattlin case, the
theory of "indentification" was seen as the reasoning behind the Thorogood de-
cision. The court apparently overlooked that in Thorogood the decedent was also
negligent. Here, two ships were traveling side by side toward the same destination.
19591
io6 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI
The theory of identification as set forth in this case was temporarily
adopted in some jurisdictions in the United States, but has now been
completely repudiated. 12 It appears, however, that the principle
underlying this theory of right of control by a passenger over the driver
has survived and continues to serve as a device for imputing negligence
under the name of joint or common enterprise.' 3
In the late 18oo's and early igoo's the criterion for imputation of
negligence between a husband and wife, in a vehicle of transportation,
was right of control.14 The 1897 case of Reading Township v. Telfer15
is representative of this period. Here the court said that as between
persons with mutual privileges of direction and control it is possible
that the negligence might be imputed from the driver to the passengers
on a theory of mutual agency or right of control. But as to a husband
and wife, the court continued, the wife could not possibly have a right
of control over her husband sufficient to impute to her his negligence
in driving.' 6 This implies that if such right of control could be found
to exist, negligence would be imputed.
By the 1930's the courts seemed to have drifted away from this
early idea that right of control sufficient to establish an agency re-
lationship is necessary for the existence of a joint enterprise. In 1923,
They brushed each other and a negligently fastened anchor dropped from the
upper deck of the defendant's ship onto the plaintiff, a passenger on the second
ship. He was denied recovery because the captain of the ship on which plaintiff
was a passenger was treated as his agent and the two were "identified." Thus
Cattlin v. Hills, through what appears to be a misinterpretation of Thorogood,
invented the doctrine of "identification."
'2Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W.2d 105 (1946), delivered the final
deathblow to Thorogood, and "identification." In the Bricker case judicial notice
was taken of the fact that England and all jurisdictions in the United States had
overruled the theory of "identification." Michigan thus became the last state to
overrule the doctrine.
' 13Prosser, Torts 364 (2d ed. 1955); Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in
Automobile Law, 6 Cornell L.Q. 320, 322 (1931).
"In New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Robbins, 38 Ind. App. 172, 76 N.E. 8o4 (19o5),
it was said that negligence would not be imputed on the basis of the marital relation-
ship alone, but that the administrator would be denied recovery if the decedent
had a right of control over the driver. See also Munger v. City of Sedalia, 66 Mo.
App. 629 (1896), which held that the negligence of the husband-driver is not im-
putable to the wife when there was no evidence that the husband was acting as her
agent in driving the buggy. Additional cases supporting this point are: Chicago
& E.R.R. v. Biddinger, 61 Ind. App. 419, io9 N.E. 953 (1915); Fishner v. Ells-
trn, 174 Iowa 364, 156 N.W. 422 (1916); City of Louisville v. Zoeller, 155 Ky. 192,
16o S.W. 5oo (1913); Ploetz v. Holt, 124 Minn. i6g, 144 N.W. 745 (1913); Senft v.
Western Maryland Ry., 246 Pa. 446, 92 Ad. 553 (1914).
157 Kan. 798, 84 Pac. 134 (1897)-
"Id. at 136.
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Bowley v. Duca17 expressed the view that "there must be not only a
joint interest in the objects or purposes of the enterprise, but also 'an
equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each
other with respect thereto'" before a joint enterprise exists.18 In cases
such as this one, it is not necessary to establish agency before finding a
joint enterprise. Between 193o and the present, the view that there
can be a joint enterprise between husband and wife if there is a right
of control plus common purpose, even though an agency relationship
cannot be established, 19 has solidified.20 The weight of authority will
not impute the.negligence of the driver to the passenger on the ground
of their marital relationship alone,21 nor find a joint enterprise be-
tween a husband and wife when they have a mere common purpose,
such as a pleasure trip.22 However, when the courts find co-ownership
of the automobile, even though there is no true agency, they do not
hesitate to find a joint enterprise, for joint ownership brings with it
the "mutual right of control" as required by most courts.
23
This, it is submitted, is the result of historical development. With
the overruling of Thorogood v. Bryan in the early 19oo's, the theory
of identification was discredited, and therefore the use of an agency re-
lationship to impute negligence fell into disrepute.24 In place of
agency the doctrine of joint enterprise developed, requiring a lesser
degree of control than that necessary to create agency. By using this
178o N.H. 548, 12o Atl. 74 (1923). See also Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis.
574, 183 N.V. 69o (1931-
1912o At. 74, 75 (1923). See also Pence v. Kansas City Laundry Serv. Co.,
332 Mo. 930, 59 S.W.2d 633, 636 (1935); Alperdt v. Paige, 292 Pa. i, 14o At. 555, 557
(1928).
uSee note 25 infra.
2See text at note 5 supra. Caliando v. Huck, 84 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Fla. 1949);
Silsby v. Hinchey, 107 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Mo. App. 1937); Dederman v. Summers, 135
Neb. 453, 282 N.W. 261 (1938).
mRoss v. British Yukon Nay. Co., 188 F.2d 779, 781 (gth Cir. 1951); Besset
v. Hockett, 66 So. 2d 694, 698 (Fla. 1953); Holmes v. Combs, 12o Ind. App. 331,
9o N.E.2d 822, 823 (1950); Bartek v. Glasers Provisions Co., 16o Neb. 794, 71 N.W.2d
466,472 (1955); White v. Keller, 215 P.2d 98o (Ore. 195o).
2Holmes v. Combs, 12o Ind. App. 331, 90 N.E.2d 822, 823 (195o); Stilson v.
Ellis, 208 Iowa, 1157, 225 NAV. 346, 351 (1929); Thompson v. Sides, 275 Mass. 568,
176 N. E. 623, 624 (1931); Remmenga v. Selk, 15o Neb. 401, 34 N.W.2d 757, 761
(1948).
12Caliando v. Huck, 84 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Fla. 1949); Moore v. Skiles, 13o
Colo. 191, 274 P.2d 311, 315 (1954). This is not to be confused with the holdings of
community property states such as California and Louisiana. In these states the non-
negligent passenger is denied recovery because it would result in unjust enrich-
ment of the negligent spouse.
MNote 12 supra.
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doctrine, a court was free of the word "identification," although the
method used and the end result were substantially the same.
25
In the Sherman case the court found the existing right of control
insufficient to establish an agency relationship or a joint enterprise.
While a majority of courts appear not to require an actual agency
relationship before they will invoke the joint enterprise doctrine,
2 6
Sherman v. Korff recognizes the necessity of doing so, since a relation-
ship not strong enough to create agency should not serve the purpose
of bringing about the results of agency. Sherman v. Korif calls this
imputation of negligence in the absence of agency an unjustified ap-
plication of an undesirable fiction, and asks of the result: "Is this law
or is this* magic?"2 7 The implication is that it is magic, but unfortu-
nately it is the law in many jurisdictions. In the case of husband and
wife co-owners, the fiction basic to many agency relationships has
brought about an undesirable result. Sherman v. Korif reaches its con-
clusibn by not incorrectly applying an agency concept to the tort doc-
trine of joint enterprise. By not adhering to what appears to be a
fictional and incorrect intermixture of theory, Sherman v. Korif has




-Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 Cornell
L.Q. 320, 322 (1931), says of these cases where joint enterprise is found without
there being an agency relationship: [O]f course, in all of these cases no actual agency
exists, for if an actual agency did exist there would be no need to resort to a theory
other than respondeat superior to obtain the desired result."
mIn Ross v. British Yukon Nay. Co., 88 F.gd 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1951), it
was said that "the generally accepted rule is that the negligence of the husband is
not to be imputed to .the wife unless he is her agent in driving the automobile
in .which she is riding or they are engaged in the prosecution of a common enter-
prise." This statement leads to the conclusion that the two concepts are indepen-
dent and thus a common enterprise can exist without there being an agency re-
lationship.
2191 N.W.2d at 486.
mSee Painter v. Lingon, 193 Va. 840, 71 S.E.2d 355 (1952), in which a similar re-
sult was reached.
